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Philip Kitcher’s and Gillian Barker’s Philosophy of Science: A New Intro-
duction is the recent contribution to textbooks in Philosophy of Science. 
This accessible introduction is intended not only for philosophy students 
but also for students and interested professionals from related fi elds, such 
as science and technology studies, humanities or social sciences. Aside from 
professionals the book is useful and informative for every reader interested 
in the subject assuming she has at least minimal knowledge on the sub-
ject. Since both authors work extensively on topics that broaden the tra-
ditional discussions in philosophy of science with accounts from social epis-
temology, sociobiology, sociology of science, political philosophy and ethical 
theory, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction seems as a natural 
summary (extension) of their previous work. Although discussions in 
philosophy of science address these issues for more than a decade and have 
moved further from the debates that dominated the twentieth century, the 
book represents a novel attempt to incorporate contemporary philosophical 
accounts of science in a fruitful introduction. Authors reconsider the core 
questions in philosophy of science by taking into account debates about 
climate changes, the role of values in scientifi c practice, science policies, 
feminist and ecological critique, the interdisciplinarity and diversity of 
science considering the changes that occurred in the scientifi c practice 
and sciences themselves.
The book is structured around six chapters and can be divided into two 
parts. The fi rst three chapters focus on content of the sciences while the 
last three consider the contexts in which scientifi c work is done. Chapter 
1 gives a good overview of the connection between science and philoso-
phy introducing the relevant questions through climate change debates 
and disputes concerning racial differences. The examples force us to ask 
philosophical questions. What is the evidence and what does it entitle 
people to believe? Who has the authority to make scientifi c judgments? 
How should we decide about future science policies? Questions like these 
lead to more general concerns about whether natural sciences are the 
uniquely best sources of human knowledge, setting standards that ought to 
be achieved in all fi elds of inquiry (p. 3). A brief history of science gives us 
further insight into how philosophers and scientist addressed these ques-
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tions through notions of causality or development of new quantitative ex-
perimental methods that established professional science. At the end of the 
chapter authors introduce three images of science that dominated historical, 
sociological and philosophical conceptions of science. The most enduring is 
the traditional image that views science as a reliable means for accumulat-
ing useful knowledge with observation as the main scientifi c method.
Therefore, the following chapter describes the analytic project in phi-
losophy of science. Authors introduce the problem of demarcating science 
which resulted in attempts to reduce science to analytical truths with 
respect to scientifi c explanation, confi rmation and structure of scientifi c 
theories. In a  critical discussion about historical attempts to discover the 
scientifi c method through contexts of discovery and justifi cation, Kitcher 
and Barker provide a few interesting examples from scientifi c practice such 
as The Discovery of Insulin, The Biology of Race or Philosophical Sources 
for the Analytic Project. Apart from displaying a brief historical overview 
it seems that the intent of the chapter is framing the problem of viewing 
science as a value free-zone and demonstrating the limitations of such an 
approach to the scientifi c practice.
This line of criticism extends to the third chapter where authors 
explore questions that where neglected in the analytical debates about 
science, namely the diversity of the sciences. Through various theories 
integrated under the ideal of unifi ed science such as naturalism and re-
ductionism Kitcher and Barker present the most prominent attempts to 
defi ne scientifi c methodology. As in previous chapter authors insist on the 
modest form of methodological naturalism emphasizing the importance of 
looking into the scientifi c practice and argue for pluralistic approach to the 
scientifi c methodology.
The remaining three chapters form the core of the textbook and its 
primary intention which is to introduce philosophical picture of science 
as a social enterprise. In order to do that, authors start with notions of 
success, truth and progress within historical reference to Kuhn’s revolu-
tionary account of science. The main epistemological and methodological 
problems – theory leadenness of observation and incommensurability the-
sis, illustrated with two famous examples Tycho and Kepler Observe the 
Dawn and The Devonian Compromise – display relativistic concerns 
about scientifi c progress. In order to preserve pluralistic view of scientifi c 
knowledge against the authoritative perspective authors accept the natu-
ral reasonableness thesis: in different areas and in different places, people 
are equipped with the same cognitive faculties, and those faculties are put 
to work in similar ways (p. 91). Since this does not solve the problem of 
relativism about scientifi c progress authors defend a special kind of plural-
ism which is compatible with realism. They suggest two ways of dealing 
with this problem, fi rst, divorcing the idea of progress from claims about 
truth and second, abandoning the thesis that there is a view from outside 
in which we can compare the world and our representations of it. According 
to the fi rst idea we should recognize the fact that people from different 
societies have different problems, depending on signifi cance they pose 
for a particular culture, which they try to resolve by developing theories 
or models that differ from the ones accepted in our society, since we are 
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focused on different problems. Therefore, scientifi c activity is determined by 
its pragmatic purposes leaving relativistic worries about scientifi c truth 
outside the debate. The second line of reasoning is also concerned with 
purposes of scientifi c activity and the main suggestion is that instead of 
looking from the outside we can observe one another. In this way Barker and 
Kitcher preserved both realism with the attractive but problematic thesis 
of natural reasonableness suggesting that, when it comes to success, our 
ordinary considerations provide enough evidence that our representations 
of the independent world are accurate, and that scientifi c progress consists 
in getting closer and closer to a true account of the parts of the world we 
consider important.
This approach to scientifi c practice gives basis for developing an im-
age of science as a social endeavor. The argument is developed from 
the critical challenges from feminist, cultural and ecological critique 
which all have in common the problem of insuffi cient diversity within 
scientifi c practice. Whether we are concerned with predominance of 
particular social or gender group or by cultural and ecological unique-
ness of specifi c parts of the world, there are damaging parts of scien-
tifi c practice as well as unfair outcomes of a particular research. We 
can learn about some interesting cases from history of science, such as 
substantive developments in Primatology or Genome research which 
occurred when women entered research. Authors examine issues that 
arise from oversimplifi cation of analytical research which is illustrated 
with an example from the history of modern Agriculture. The main sug-
gestion is that recognizing the social environment of researchers should 
not inspire the conclusion that attention to the evidence is inevitably 
overwhelmed by baser urges (p. 125). In somewhat condense passage 
authors elaborate familiar themes and problems from social philosophy 
of science like the problem of scientifi c consensus, cognitive variation, 
distribution of scientifi c labor or the reward and recognition system in 
science. Those familiar with Kitcher’s previous work can recognize his 
contribution in claims that we should abandon the myth of pure science 
(scientist) and assert that extra-scientifi c motivations can promote 
good community strategies (p. 128) or that the knowledge we have is 
dependent on past social decisions. All these claims support the main 
agenda of the textbook which is to provide a philosophical perspective 
of science that is not and should not be value-free.
The last chapter focuses on framing the problem of values within 
philosophy of science debate with respect to contemporary scientifi c 
controversies. In order to elaborate their view authors start by stat-
ing that the aim of science is to provide us with true answers to sig-
nifi cant questions. The view is developed by integrating two traditional 
answers, fi rst is that scientifi c research aims at explanation, prediction 
and control and the second, which states that science aims at truth. The 
defi nition according to which signifi cant truths are those that enhance 
our understanding or that enable us to predict events or to intervene 
in nature (p. 137) opens debate for normative issues about whose 
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goals ought to be considered in respect to signifi cant questions. Kitcher 
and Barker want to develop an account of scientifi c inquiry that goes 
against reductivist strategies which according to them neglected the 
complex causal interconnections. What they have in mind specifi cally 
is the fact that science often excludes certain truths or values and the 
reason for that is because it excludes certain kind of people. From this, 
authors develop an argument for an account of science that should not 
try to be value-free and construct basis for their own picture of scien-
tifi c research which debunks the autonomy of sciences suggesting an 
ideal of well-ordered science. The fi rst problem addresses the question 
of determining what kind of autonomy is possible. Specifically the di-
rection of scientifi c research. When we observe relationship between 
scientists, larger society and contemporary scientifi c practice it seems 
that (whether we are inclined toward governmental or market con-
trol view) today’s science is far from autonomous. Therefore, authors 
suggest an ideal as an attempt to approach the notion of signifi cance 
in order to make way for determining the aims of sciences. They sug-
gest Kitcher’s concept of well-ordered science. Scientifi c research must 
involve a concept of ideal deliberation which is defi ned as a discussion 
among representatives of the different predicaments and perspectives 
found in the inclusive human population (our entire species, past, 
present and future). Those representatives are required to readjust the 
wishes with which they come to the discussion, by taking account of the 
best available information about nature and about the prospects for 
research of different kinds, and by recognizing the equal worth of their 
fellow discussants and of their perspectives and preferences. (...) They 
endeavor to reach consensus on how research should be directed (what 
it should aim at), how it should be conducted, what standards should 
be used in adopting potential new items of knowledge, and what uses 
might be made of the knowledge that research delivers (p. 151). There 
are further conditions that have to be met in order to achieve well-
ordered science which introduces democratic values and procedures in 
scientifi c practice. The concept is of course an ideal to which we should 
strive since alternatives are, according to Kitcher and Barker, far from 
acceptable and sketched by examples like Climate Change Controver-
sies or Disease Research and Global Health. The examples are simple 
illustrations of not only what happens in contemporary science when 
we depart from the proposed ideal but also of how complicated and 
interdisciplinary are today’s research and science policies. Therefore, in 
a fi eld that is rapidly evolving Kitcher and Barker suggest we keep 
up. Image of philosophy of science developed in the textbook frames 
familiar problems in more expansive way taking into account cur-
rent scientifi c practice and controversies. From that point we can move 
beyond traditional debates in an effort to develop epistemological and 
metaphysical accounts of science that is not value-free. Furthermore, 
authors suggest that scientifi c research should aim toward an ideal of 
a well-ordered practice which is defi ned as a social endeavor.
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It is important to mention that every chapter in the book contains 
an extensive further reading lists and numerous illustrative examples 
from science which portrait very well some of the problems the book 
addresses. However, it is not always clear who are the intended readers 
since some parts of the book clearly demand background knowledge 
rendering the book a bit ambiguous for uninformed reader but there 
are also parts of the text where claims are put forward in somewhat 
condense and theoretically oversimplifi ed manner. For example, one en-
tire chapter is concentrated on Kuhn’s revolutionary account of science. 
Parts of his theory as its critics are elaborated in detail as is the case 
with the analytic project in philosophy of science. Both are of course 
important and necessary for introducing the picture of science as a 
social endeavor. However, authors completely neglected philosophers 
like R. Merton, R. Hull, H. Longino, L. Laudan or I. Lakatos. If the 
book was intended for students then sometimes it lacks clarity and 
completeness in sketching historical and theoretical background of a 
particular problem. However, for the ones teaching philosophy of sci-
ence it can provide a useful overview of the current state of the fi eld 
and of contemporary scientifi c practice with some new perspectives 
on philosophy of science debates. Therefore, the textbook reaches its 
agenda in providing a more expansive and novel approach to teaching 
philosophy of science. Regardless of a few shortcomings, Philosophy of 
Science: A New Introduction is a valuable contribution to textbooks in 
philosophy of science. It frames the most important problems in philoso-
phy of science in contemporary context taking into account real scientifi c 
practice. Aside from that, it introduces many issues that are open for 
debate and contemplation which makes it both instructive and useful 
for students and professionals in the fi eld.
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